Theses - Daytona Beach

Dissertations and Theses

Spring 2010

Effect of Time Pressure and Task Uncertainty on Human Operator
Performance and Workload for Autonomous Aerial Vehicle
Missions
Trevor Peterson
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University - Daytona Beach

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/db-theses
Part of the Aerospace Engineering Commons, and the Aviation Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Peterson, Trevor, "Effect of Time Pressure and Task Uncertainty on Human Operator Performance and
Workload for Autonomous Aerial Vehicle Missions" (2010). Theses - Daytona Beach. 165.
https://commons.erau.edu/db-theses/165

This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University – Daytona Beach at
ERAU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in the Theses - Daytona Beach collection by an
authorized administrator of ERAU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

EFFECT OF TIME PRESSURE AND TASK UNCERTAINTY ON HUMAN OPERATOR
PERFORMANCE AND WORKLOAD
FOR AUTONOMOUS AERIAL VEHICLE MISSIONS

by
TREVOR PETERSON
B.S. Colorado State University, 2007

A Thesis Submitted to the
Department of Human Factors & Systems
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Human Factors and Systems.

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Uni\ersity
Daytona Beach, FL
"Spring 2010

UMI Number: EP31904

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations
and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

®

UMI

UMI Microform EP31904
Copyright 2011 by ProQuest LLC
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

EFFECT OF TIME PRESSURE AN TASK UNCERTAINTY ON HUMAN OPERATOR
PERFORMANCE AND WORKLOAD FOR AUTONOMOUS AERIAL VEHICLE MISSIONS
by
Trevor Peterson
This thesis was prepared under the direction of the candidate's thesis committee chair, Dr. Dahai
Liu, Ph.D., Department of Human Factors & Systems, and has been approved by members of the
thesis committee. It was submitted to the Department of Human Factors & Systems and has been
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Human
Factors & Systems.

THESIS COMMITTEE:

U-,

/uVt^

Dahai Liu, Ph.D., Chair

Shawn Doherty, Ph.D., Member

Dennis Vincenzi, Ph.D., Member

Departrafent Chair, Department of Human Factors & Systems

^Assogkttevice President for Academics

I

Abstract
Author:

Trevor Peterson

Title:

Effect of Time Pressure and Task Uncertainty on I luman Operator Performance
and Workload for Autonomous Aerial Vehicle Missions

Institution:

Embry Riddle Aeronautical University

Year:

2010

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being utilized at an increasing rate for a number
of military applications. The potential for their use in the national airspace is also of interest to
the Federal Aviation Administration, but there are some concerns about the safety of Hying
unmanned aircraft. The role of a UAS operator differs from that of a pilot in a manned aircraft,
and this new role creates a need for a shift in interface and task design in order to take advantage
of the full potential of these systems. This study examined the effect of time pressure and task
uncertainty ha\e on autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle operator task performance and
workload. Thirty undergraduate students at Embry-Riddlc Aeronautical University participated
in this study. The primary task was image identification, and secondary tasks consisted of
responding to exents encountered in typical UAS operations. Time pressure was found to
produce a significant difference in subjective workload ratings as well as secondary task
performance scores, while task uncertainty was found to produce a significant difference in the
primary task performance scores. The results were examined, and recommendations for future
research are discussed.
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Introduction
Currently there are over 100 U.S. companies developing more than 300 different Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) designs (FAA, 2009a). Some UASs are able to remain in the air for 30
hours or more because there is no need to land and change pilots. This provides a much more
efficient method for accomplishing goals which require long mission times. Not onlv do current
capabilities of UASs allow for the completion of tasks at less cost than current manned aircraft,
they also offer the ability to perform tasks that are deemed too dangerous for manned aircraft.
The military utilizes UASs to perform these "dull, dirty, and dangerous" missions to avoid the
risk of losing human life.

UASs are also on the verge of being utilized within the national airspace. There are currently
very few UASs allowed to operate in limited areas, due to uncertainty with the safety related to
operating a UAS (AIR-160, 2008). Once these safety concerns are alleviated, the capabilities of
UASs can be utilized in a vast number of activities which have not as of yet been discovered.
Border patrol, pipeline inspection, crop inspection, law enforcement, and a multitude of
applications could be enhanced by the use of UASs in the future. The concerns about UAS
safety revolve around the ability of a remotely located pilot to fly in a manner which is safe not
only to the aircraft itself, but to everything in the vicinitv of the aircraft (Wilson, 2007). There
are numerous arguments for research to focus on the differences between manned and unmanned
flight with regards to level of safety (DeGarmo & Maroney. 2008; Duke, Vanderpool. & Duke,
2007; Tvaryanas, Thompson, & Constable, 2006).
Accident rates of UASs far exceed those for manned flight. While the idea behind unmanned
flidit is to avoid the risk to human life, there is still a cost associated with losing a UAS. It is
therefore prudent to discover the causes behind the high rate of accidents for UASs. and begin to
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prov ide solutions to some of the issues. Because the military is the largest user of current UAS
technology, most of the research has been conducted with military operations in mind. A large
amount of this research points to human factors as an area which needs a considerable amount of
further study in order to achieve a level of safety equal to that of manned aircraft (Williams,
2004).

Specific human factors issues associated with UASs involve the fact that the human operator
has a significantly different role than a pilot in a manned aircraft. This new role requires a shift
not only in personnel selected for the job, but the training involved, and an interface design
which allows for the optimal cooperation between human and automation in order to achieve the
full potential of the system as a whole (Nelson & Bolia, 2006). Research on interface design has
opened up new areas of interest, including the control of multiple UASs by one operator. This
requires a whole new way of thinking about the implementation of automation and how it affects
the operator. The operator of a UAS must be able to monitor not only the state of the aircraft,
but that of the aircraft's environment, as well as the control station. This heightens the cognitive
demand placed on the operator, and effects on workload are expected. Certain interface designs
may be utilized to mediate these effects and the impact of implementing these interfaces is an
essential area of research.

Previous research has looked at workload imposed during a multi-UAS controlling task.
However, workload effects have been difficult to attain with regards to the number of vehicles
being controlled (Liu, Wasson, & Vincenzi, 200S; Reynolds, 2009). This study will focus on
using tasks common to the control of UASs to manipulate workload in the operator.
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The first area of interest in the current study is the use of UASs for target detection. One of
the main roles of UASs in military use today is one of target acquisition. This is made difficult
by the technology currently in use, due to low fidelity imaging, inaccuracy of automation in
target detection, and uncertainty associated with images (MeCarley & Wickens, 2005). All of
these difficulties require the human operator to expend some level of cognitive resources in order
to solve them and accurately designate enemy targets. The effect on shifting operator workload
has ripple effects on other tasks necessary for the operation of a UAS.
Another area of importance is time pressure effects on the workload of the operator, and any
performance detriments they may cause. Current levels of automation can assist the human
operator with many tasks, but when the operator's workload is already high, the assistance of a
decision aid, and the time pressure it is associated with, may increase workload and therefore
cause performance issues. The relationship between time pressure, workload, and automation is
a complex one that has proven difficult to study. Research conducted on UAS operation found
that participants rarely utilized the automation, even when time pressure was added and
workload was increased (Ruff, Calhoun, Draper, Fontejon, & Guilfoos, 2004).
The current study focuses on the workload imposed on a human operator during a UAS
mission task involving varying time pressures and levels of task uncertainty. The studv will not
only measure workload directly but include measures of performance in order to determine anv
effects elevated workload may have on performing necessary tasks. In the next section the
history of UAS development, as well as current and future uses of UASs, will be reviewed. This
is followed bv a review of human-automation interaction and the human factors issues associated
with it. In particular, this thesis is focused on a review of previous research on target acquisition
and time pressure, and their effects on workload.
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UAS Development
There is no universal definition for a UAS, and the characteristics of UASs have evolved
quite a bit since their inception. The Department of Defense defines a UAS as "A powered,
aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle
lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can
carry a lethal or non-lethal payloacT, but the DoD excludes cruise missiles and other forms of
ballistic vehicles from their definition (Department of Defense, 2005). The FAA on the other
hand, defines UASs as an "Airplane, airship, powered lift, or rotorcraft that operates with the
pilot in command off-board, for purposes other than sport or recreation, also known as unmanned
aerial vehicle" The differences in the definition of UASs by these governing bodies can be
attributed to the differing roles UASs play for each, as well as the many paths of development
UASs have gone through before reaching their current status.
Roles of UASs in the Past
The concept of a pilotless aircraft had its beginnings in the last part of the nineteenth century
with an inventor named Nikola Tesla (Neweome, 2004). Tesla was able to give a practical
demonstration of wireless control with a torpedo which he marketed to the U.S. Navy. The Navy
soon gave up on Tesla's radio-controlled torpedo, but his demonstration opened the door for
other scientists to pursue the same technology in flight. One such scientist was Elmer Sperry
who built on Tesla's ideas by using radio frequencies to control aircraft. The early development
of unmanned aircraft was reliant on three crucial technologies: automatic stabilization, remote
control, and autonomous navigation. Sperry was the first person to attempt to solve all three
problems at once and, w ith the assistance of his son. was able to demonstrate the ability to
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remotely pilot an aircraft over a certain distance and dive at a specified target. Because of the
intention to dive at a target, Sperry s technology was referred to as an "aerial torpedo"
(Newcome, 2004). With successful demonstrations to officials in the armed forces, unmanned
aircraft sparked interest in military applications and the development of technologies used in
unmanned flight were tied directly to the needs of the military.

Spcrry's demonstration of an unmanned aerial torpedo that could be flown into an enemy
target peaked the interest of the U.S. military, but the role of unmanned aircraft would soon turn
to one of training. On the suggestion of British officials, the U.S. started flying unmanned
aircraft as targets used for the training of pilots and anti-aircraft gunners to improve their
accuracy and dog-fighting abilities. In the early 1960's, the idea of using unmanned aircraft as
spy planes gained popularity, mostly due to the danger that pilots Hying U2 spy planes faced at
the time. There were instances of U2 pilots being shot down over hostile territory, which made
the need for operating unmanned spy planes all the more evident (Wagner &. Sloan, 1992). The
cold war spurred on many more advancements in unmanned aircraft, including furthering the
abilities of UAVs to perform reconnaissance missions safely, and the ability to carry and deliver
lethal payloads. Once weapons are added to the abilities of the system, it is often referred to as
an Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV). A graphical representation of the evolution of
UAVs is idven in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. U A V Evolution (Department of Defense, 2001)

After the end of the cold war, the United States spends less on defense and is more likely to
be involved with peacekeeping and humanitarian missions rather than with full theater wars
(Glade, 2000). With this role change, United States' vital interests are often not directly at stake.
The policymakers are then given more flexibility when responding to situations if technology
allows for the completion of missions without risk to human lives. Because of this distinct
advantage of utilizing U A V s , one of Congress' goals for the development of UAVs states that
one third of the aircraft in the deep strike force should be unmanned by 2010 (Department of

Defense, 2007).
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Present Roles of UASs
The roles of UASs have expanded greatly within the military in the last few years, and every
branch of the U.S. military now employs their own form of a UAS in their intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance operations (Cooke, 2006). UASs have played a major role in
both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, and have done so without
putting American pilots' lives in danger (Scarborough, 2003; Guidry & Wills, 2004).
Although the military is presently the major arena for the operation of UAVs, there is a large
amount of interest in expanding current roles of UAVs into domestic and commercial operations.
The potential uses of UAVs are numerous in the areas of law enforcement, weather prediction
and tracking, agriculture, national security, and many others that have not as of yet been
explored. The future of UASs in the national airspace is questionable however, due to the
differences in how manned and unmanned aircraft are controlled, as well as current regulations
which are not designed for autonomous aircraft.
Future Roles of UASs
The largest hurdle to introducing UAVs into the NAS is the inability of UAVs to "detect, see,
and avoid" other traffic (FAA, 200%). It is of critical importance to the FAA that UAVs don't
come to close to passenger aircraft or endanger people in any way. The process of collision
avoidance has many layers to protect aircraft. Figure 2 shows the various layers involved with
collision avoidance, and demonstrates how "see and a\oid" tactics are a last effort due to noncooperative air traffic.
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Figure 2 Collision Axoidance System (Taibeit 2007)

Duke Vanderpool and Duke (2007) contend that the FAA is appioaching the pioblem ol
detect, see and avoid ' in the wiong mannei

The authois aigue that undei instiument flight

conditions (those in which visibility is low and the pilot has to completely lely on the
instmments in the aircraft), an unmanned aircialt is no diffcient than a manned aiiciatt

Because

manned aiiciatt still opeiatc salcly undei these conditions UAVs should be attoided the same
access to the NAS
Anothei major concern toi the FAA is the loss ot communication between a UAS and the
icmote opeiator Cuirentk theie is no dedicated ci\il go\eminent piotccted fiequcnc\ with
which to contiol UASs and most UASs use militaix licqucnucs (DcGaimo cV Maionex 200S)
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Most UASs are designed to fly a holding pattern when the signal from the operator is lost, but
this strategy can potentially cause problems in high traffic areas.

What the FAA demands from UASs, is an equivalent level of safety with manned aircraft
(Wilson, 2007). This means that accident rates for UAS flight must match up to that of manned
flight. In order to achieve this, technology and human operators must work together to avoid
conflicts with other aircraft. The FAA has issued sexeral Certificates of Authorization for flying
UAVs in civilian airspace, but only under strict stipulations. The FAA has developed the
Unmanned Aircraft Program Office, which reviews applications for flight certificates, and can
issue special airworthiness certificates based on those applications (AIR-160, 200S). There are
currently a number of organizations working on developing standards to define minimum
requirements for UASs, in an effort to address the technological, regulator)', and performance
issues with operating UASs (DcGarmo & Maroney, 200S).

Human Factors Issues with UAS Operation
The crucial issue in implementing state of the art technologies, such as UASs, is not one of
hardware creation, but of the assimilation of sensor) inputs, the processing information pertinent
to user goals, and translation of the user's decisions into subsequent actions (Oron-Gilad, Chen,
& Hancock, 2006). This means that the main obstacle in successfully employing UASs on a
wide scale is inherently a user centered one. In order to reach the full potential of these state of
the art technologies, the initial system design must take into consideration the capabilities and
limitations of the human operator. This includes the information provided to the human
operator, which must support human perception, understanding, reasoning, and decision making
in mission environments (Department of Defense. 2007).
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England's earlx eltorts at dexeloping UASs weie often reteiied to as humans in the loop '
which demonstrates iccognition ot the human iole in the svstem (Nexxcome, 2004) That
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concepts within UASs (Woich et al , 1096)
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lespectixe UASs, rexeals that accidents among UASs are nearly double those among manned
an craft (\\ illiams, 2004) Manx ol the accidents analyzed can be directly attributed to human
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Identifying human factors problems related to UASs can be difficult due to the fact that
problems seen with one type of aircraft xvould never be seen in another. For example, design
problems with the user interface cannot be generalized across different designs due to the fact
that the user interfaces vary so much across different types of aircraft (Williams, 2004). The
Department of Defense has stated that one of the mam objectives in the dexelopment of UASs is
a common interface which xvould allow for greater interoperability (Department of Defense,
2007). The current state of UASs is far from realizing this objective. While some UASs have
been dexeloped with an interface which is similar to flying a manned aircraft, utilizing throttle
and stick controls, others have very different interfaces than those in traditional aviation, and are
not as much "flown" as they are "commanded" (Nelson & Bolia, 2006). These types of
interfaces utilize a much higher level of automation, which represents a paradigm shift in the
way controllers need to think and act when controlling a UAS. Ever increasing lex els of
automation means that the human user takes on a role of supervisor, and becomes extremely
dependant on an adequate interface in order to effectively control the UAS.
Humans and Automation
Manufacturers often attempt to automate the human "out of the loop" which means they rely
on increasing automation in response to any issues that max arise (Cooke, 2006). This tactic
does not however solve human factors issues with the control of UASs, but creates nexx' and
distinct challenges to the operators. Even within highly autonomous sx stems such as UASs,
humans arc expected to proxide high-lexel objectixes. set rules of engagement, supply
operational constraints, as well as support launch and recoxery operations (Department of
Defense, 2007). The use of automation can often cause adxerse effects in the performance of the
operators using the system, if there is not enough attention paid to human factors issues.
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The cause of these effects was termed "clumsy automation" by Werner and Curry when they
were first observed in 1980 (Wiener & Curry, 1980). Since then, it has been recognized that the
implementation of automation can change the way human operators perccixe situations in ways
unintended by the system designers (Billings, 1997; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). The
unintended consequences of the effects automation has on the human operators can then lead to
human vigilance decrements, detection capabilities, limited system flexibility, and automation
biases (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). These issues with automation provide a
number of challenges to implementing highly autonomous systems such as UASs. Billings
(1997) provides an ansxver to these concerns through a number of guidelines to human centered
automation:

•

The pilot bears responsibility for safety of flight

•

Pilots must remain in command of their flights

•

The pilot must be actively inxolved

•

The pilot must be adequately informed

•

The operator must be able to monitor the automation assisting them

•

The automated systems must therefore be predictable

•

The automated sx stems must also monitor the human operator

•

Every intelligent system element must knoxv the intent of other intelligent system
elements

These guidelines establish automation as a member of a team, which must remain
coordinated with the other team members in order to achiexe a common goal. This concept has
been corroborated by Putzer and Onken (2001), xxho state that in order for the human operator to
make effectixe decisions, the machine and human must interact dxnamically as a single sxstem.
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Under these circumstances however, the human operator must still oversee automation to ensure
accuracy of the decisions being implemented, particularly when unexpected events occur. The
question of which functions to allocate to which part of the system, either human operator or
automation, then becomes a difficulty.

Function allocation has been defined as the assignment of required functions to resources,
instruments or agents (Sheridan, 1998). The distribution of functions betxveen humans and
automation has been a focus of human factors professionals for years. While automation is
efficient at performing specified tasks, higher level functions involved with superx ising an
automated system such as sensing unusual situations in the environment, detecting unusual
stimuli, and goal oriented decision making seem to be better suited for human performance
(Sanders & MeCormick, 1993). More recent function allocation strategies haxe focused not so
much on dividing functions betxveen humans and machines, but designing the system in such a
fashion that it produces an effective coordination betxveen the two (Hughes, 2008). Schulte
(2002) recommends a similar approach, which leads to a cooperative system design between
humans and automation in order to take advantage of the strengths of each. Figure 4 shoxvs
examples of resources of different parts of a human-automation system which can be enhanced
through man-machine cooperation.
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Figure 4. Synergetic resources to be exploited through man-machine cooperation (Schulte, 2002)
Previous studies on UASs have suggested that increasing the number of functions allocated to
automation can result in a decrease in operator workload (Dixon, Wickens, & Chang, 2003).
When highly autonomous systems are being used however, human operators can often rely on
the automation inappropriately, trusting the machine to perform functions which may be better
suited to their own strengths. This overreliance on automation is referred to as misuse, whereas
not utilizing the advantages of automation is referred to as disuse (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
When automation is either misused or disused, the system cannot operate as efficiently as
possible because the strengths of each component are not being fully utilized. The trend of
system design seems to inevitably move towards increasing the level of automation to the
greatest extent possible. This design strategy does not allow an adequate level of human
involvement, and can lead to failure of the entire system. If the human operator is not able to
perform the role of supervisor and act as a fail-safe, it can threaten the safety of not only the
UAS itself, but anything else in the vicinity of the aircraft.
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The level of automation implemented in the UAS then becomes an important factor in
determining how safely and efficiently the system will operate in general. Management by
consent and management by exception are the two most common design methods for
implementing automation in a user interface. Management by consent is a level of automation in
which the automation provides suggestions for action, but does not carry it out until the operator
gives approval, while management by exception is a level in which the automation will carry out
the recommended course of action unless the operator commands otherwise (McCarley, 2004).
Research has found that there are differences in the benefits gained from these two levels of
automation in a UAS supervisory monitoring task (Ruff, Narayanan, & Draper, 2002). The
different benefits from the levels of automation come with different detriments to performance as
well. Increased automation may decrease workload, but may also increase the reliance of the
human operator on automation to the point that the automation is being misused. Decreased
automation may have the opposite effect on workload, increasing it to dangerous levels, as well
as reducing the ability of the user to rely on automation when it may be necessary. The goal
becomes to design a system with an appropriate lex el of automation, which provides the operator
with enough information to maintain situation awareness, but not so much as to increase
workload. Chun, Spura, Alvidrez, and Stiles (2006) recommended a highly autonomous system
with an interface which suggests appropriate responses to situations and factors in operator
workload, especially during emergencies when workload becomes heightened.

Workload

Mental workload can be described as the relationship between the mental resources
demanded by a task, and those resources available to be supplied by the human operator
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008). The implementation of automation can alleviate
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excess workload for a wide \ariety of tasks, and has made possible many complex tasks which
would be inconceivable otherwise. The operation of UASs in dangerous airspace is an obvious
example of this, but how this high level of automation affects the workload of the operator is an
issue which still requires further study.

It is clear that appropriate use of automation within a UAS could potentially lead to the
freeing up of human resources to perform more complex tasks for which they are better suited.
Dixon, Wickens, and Chang (2003) found that allocation of flight control to automation led to
higher performance on concurrent target identification and system failure identification tasks,
which the authors attribute to the reduced level of workload.

High levels of workload can lead

to performance detriments, but it is important to note that workload levels which are too low can
haxe the same effect (Crcscenzio, Miranda, Periani, & Bombardi, 2007). Often an operator
experiencing low workload levels xvill lose track of tasks the system is performing, losing
situation awareness, and inevitably causing performance problems. When the operator needs to
become involved in the system again, such as during an unexpected event, workload increases as
they attempt to regain the lost situation awareness.
Not only can automation lead to a high level of workload, but situations which create high
workload in the operator can lead to an overreliance on the automation. When workload is too
high, and there are not enough cognitive resources available to support a calculated rational
choice, operators can simply rely on automation to make a decision for them (Lee & See, 2004).
This is often a misuse of the automation and can result in tactical errors. When these types of
errors occur during UAS flight, safety becomes compromised and becomes an area of major
concern.
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Measurement of Workload
Many methods exist to determine lexel of workload in a human operator, and can be
categorized into four groups: operator performance, subjective ratings, analytic methods, and
physiological measures. Improper procedures for measuring workload can not only fail to
correctly detect lexel of workload, but can interfere with the operator and have an effect on the
workload themselves. Workload measures need to be selected based on their sensitivity,
diagnostic capability, and intrusiveness, as these are the most important properties to consider
when implementing a measure (Eggemeier, Wilson, Dramer, & Damos, 1991). The sensitivity
of a measure refers to the ability to distinguish betxveen different levels of workload. A measure
that is not sensitive enough for a given task can produce results which show no change in
workload where there actually is a change. Diagnostic capability refers to the abilitv to
distinguish the source of the workload. This is particularly important in complex tasks xxhich
inxolxe effort from multiple modalities. Finally, intrusixeness is the level to xxhich the measure
interferes xvith the operator's ability to perform the primarx task. If the measure is distracting or
impedes the operator from performing the primarx task, it is considered to be highly intrusive.
For the current study, subjective measures haxe been chosen due to their sensitivity, high
face validity, ease of use, and comparability. Previous studies haxe also utilized subjective
measures, and demonstrated their usefulness (Liu, Wasson, & Yincenzi, 2008; Reynolds, 2009).
As a subjective rating, the NASA-TLX will be used due to its sensitivity to individual
components of mental workload (Hart & Stax eland, 19SS).
Additionally, performance measures will be utilized in order to directly demonstrate
differences in workload. Secondary tasks will add more workload in order to demonstrate the
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upper limits of workload not achieved through the primary task alone. It is imperative that the
secondary tasks do not intrude on performance of the primary task if they are to be reliable
measures of workload. For this reason, participants were instructed that the primary task of
target detection will hold priority oxer other tasks, and should be completed before attention is
paid to the secondary tasks.

Task

Uncertainty

The fact that human operators are physically separated from the aircraft in a UAS, can cause
a problem referred to as out of the loop unfamiliarity in xxhich the operator lacks adequate levels
of situation awareness needed to operate a UAS efficiently( Wickens, 1992). Specific problems
include poor spatial resolution, limited field of view, low update rates, and delayed image
updating (McCarley & Wickens, 2005). The unfamiliarity experienced by operators is a result of
not only lack of v isual cues, but those from other sensory inputs as xvell. McCarley and Wickens
(2004) studied some of the effects of remov ing the pilot from the aircraft, and termed this lack of
sensory inputs "sensory isolation" The result of sensory isolation is human operators xxho showhigh levels of boredom, decreased recognition performance, and degraded target detection
(Txaryanas, Thompson, & Constable, 2006).
The abilitv to identify and locate targets in real time is a current shortfall of UAS technologv
(Department of Defense, 2007). While manned aircraft haxe the advantage of a relatively wide
field of view, UASs are generally limited to a few visual displays, from which the operator must
be able to glean a large amount of information. When the capabilities of UASs expanded to
carry lethal payloads, the importance of accurate decision making regarding target identification
became infinitelx more important. The identification of targets is particular!}, difficult due to the
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low fidelity and restricted visual angle available to UAS operators, and this is made ex en more
complicated when the target lies amidst an array of distracting information, which is often the
case w ith military operations. Uncertainty describes the condition an observer experiences when
v icwing an image which contains confusing distracter items (Vierck & Miller, 2007). When
there is a high level of uncertainty in the decision making process, humans will actively search
out ways to reduce that uncertainty by gathering more information, and when all else fails,
simply suppress the uncertainty and take action (Lipshitz, 1997). These strategies have serious
implications in target identification.

To alleviate the uncertainty associated with target identification, and due to the potential for
high fratricide rates, many target identification systems have been developed. These systems are
designed as an automated decision aid for the identification of fnendh troops, but it is not
certain whether performance on target identification has actually improved because of problems
w ith human-automation interaction (Galster, Bolia, Roe, & Parasuraman, 2001). Humans show
difficulty relying on this type of automation appropriately, particularly when it is imperfect
(Wang, Jamicson, & Hollands, 2009). Studies haxe demonstrated that when there is high
uncertainty identifying a target in a visual display, by default, operators tend to rely on
automation's ability to make the correct identification (Beck, McKinney, Dzindolet, & Pierce,
2009; Conejo & Wickens, 1997; Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, Dawe, & Anderson, 2001). The ability
of technology to correctly identify a target is not as accurate as a human. This overreliance on
automated target identification s}stems is onh exacerbated when a decision needs to be made
quickly, as is often the case in combat operations.

20

Time Pressure
In a time sensitive env ironment, decision making can become much more taxing on a human
operator. Time pressure can have the effect of making a somewhat mundane task more
challenging and therefore pleasurable. This suggestion is contrasted by more extreme states
occun-ing when time pressure is so great that people consider a task impossible to complete in an
allotted time frame (Maule, 1997). In either case, time pressure adds workload to a task, and m
the latter case, that workload exceeds the capacity of the person performing the task. Time
pressure may lead to the reallocation of resources from the decision process to stress coping
mechanisms, change the goals in a decision situation, as well as modify the structuring and
processing of information (Svenson, 1997). This reorganization of cognitive functions can result
in an increase in workload associated with the time pressure.
Research has demonstrated the increase in workload due to time pressure, and found that
performance decreased as a result (Hughes & Babski-Reeves, 2005). This is particularlv evident
in tasks which already present high levels of stress to the operator, such as target identification.
Another study found that during a target identification task, time pressure resulted in degraded
ability to distinguish friend from foe (Burke, Oron-Gilad, Convvav, & Hancock, 2007).
Situations which cause this type of problem pose a serious threat to military operations through
increased fratricide rates.
Researchers have attempted to mediate the excess workload placed on humans when time
pressure is introduced by utilizing decision aids. The most beneficial type of decision aid and
the best method of implementation is still a topic of disagreement. One studx found that displays
showing onlv status information were superior to decision aids in achieving optimal performance

21

on a decision making task during flight (Sarter, Schroeder, & McGuirl, 2001). The results of this
study also point out however, that while performance xvas enhanced, time to complete the task
was increased. When under time pressure, it may be optimal to provide actual command
suggestions to the human to alleviate workload. One study found that in a target acquisition task,
priming has different effects on performance depending on visual rclatedness of the prime to the
target, and accuracy of the decision aid (Hailston & Davis, 2006). One drawback of
implementing any type of decision aid, particularly in a task such as target detection, is the
reliability of the automation. Time pressure can increase workload to the point that humans
demonstrate an overreliance on automation (Glade, 2000). This implies that when time pressure
increases workload, humans xvill trust automation to make the correct decision, even when it is
known that the automation is not perfectly reliable. This seems to be a coping mechanism to
deal with the added stress of time pressure.

Summary

The highlv autonomous nature of UASs has advanced the debate about the interaction
betxveen humans and automation. The environment in which they operate, and the ability of a
human operator to understand and control a UAS within that enx ironment, introduce a significant
human factors problem. This is a problem which must be addressed if xve are to realize the full
potential of this technology. One of the largest road blocks to the full implementation of UASs
is a proper user interface which can alleviate some of the problems currently being experienced.
In order to determine the efficacy of an interface, we must determine and understand the
consequences for the human operator when using that interface.
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The history of UASs demonstrates the industry's focus on developing the technology around
task capabilities, with little thought for how the new technology affects the human operator. The
reliance on automation to solve any and all issues which arise has caused a drastic change in the
role of a human in the system, and little research to support the new role. The main area of
importance with regards to UAS research revolves around the idea that the human retains sole
responsibility for the system. Future design should implement a human centric approach, and
construct the entire system outward from there. This requires a large amount of research into the
most beneficial interface with regards to human capabilities and limitations.
One area of limitation humans experience during the control of a UAS is workload, which
can range from being excessive enough to cause performance detriments, to being too low to
maintain vigilance. These workload effects are difficult to anticipate, particular!}' with new
technology such as an interface which allows the control of multiple UASs. What is not known
is how different tasks associated xvith UAS operation affect workload, and may potentially
deteriorate performance.
One of the most important tasks of a UAS is reconnaissance and target identification. This
task is xvell suited for UASs due to the fact that the aircraft can fix above areas believed to
contain possible targets without endangering human lives in doing so. The quality of images
gathered by a UAS can be limited, thus creating excessive workload for the operator xxho must
correctly identify any targets. The xvorkload is further heightened by the time pressure
associated with typical UAS missions. Automation can relieve some of that workload by
identifying the targets and making suggestions to the operator, but automation can be inaccurate
in doing so. The human operator must retain supervisory control oxer the entire svstem. and
therefore must be able to verily any target identification before allowing the automation to
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execute any tasks. There is a need for further research into target identification tasks while
operating a UAS, in order to understand the roles that should be assigned to either the human
operator or the automation so that the full potential of human-machine interaction can be
achieved.

This stud}' addresses the effect of time pressure and task uncertainty on operator
performance and workload while operating a UAS. The following hypotheses xvere formulated
for this study:
Statement of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: When participants arc exposed to high uncertainty targets, they will report higher
workload than when they are exposed to low uncertainty targets.
Hypothesis 2: When participants are exposed to high uncertainty targets, they will score lower
on primary task performance measures than when they are exposed to low
uncertainty targets.
Hypothesis 3: When participants are exposed to high uncertainty targets, they will score lower
on secondary task performance measures than when the} are exposed to low
uncertainty targets.
Hypothesis 4: When participants experience a three second time limit in target processing, they
will report higher workload than when the} experience a six second time limit.
Hypothesis 5: When participants experience a three second time limit on target processing, thev
will score lower on image accuracy than w hen the} experience a six second time
limit.
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Hypothesis 6: When participants experience a three second time limit on target processing they
will score higher on secondary task performance measures than when they
experience a six second time limit.
Hypothesis 7: An interaction will exist between time limit on target processing and uncertainty
of targets with regard to workload. Specifically, when participants experience a
three second time limit, task uncertainty will create less of a workload effect than
when they experience a six second time limit.
Hypothesis cX: An interaction will exist between time limit on target processing and uncertainty
of targets with regard to secondary task performance. Specifically, when
participants experience a three second time limit, task uncertainty will create less
of an effect on secondary task performance than when they experience a six
second time limit.
Methods

Participants

Thirty participants from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University were recruited to participate
in the study. Participants were offered extra credit in an undergraduate course in exchange for
their participation and were asked to sign a consent form acknowledging their willingness to
participate in this study (See Appendix A).

, I ppa I'd t us

The apparatus consisted of a standard computer running a UAS software test bed simulation
device called MI1IRO (Multi-modal Immersive Intelligent Interface for Remote Operations).
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The MIIIRO test bed has been previously utilized as an UAS simulator (Nelson, Lefebvre, &
Andre, 2004; Tso et al., 2003). The software was designed by IA Tech with support from the Air
Force Research Laboratory, and is designed to conduct research for and simulate long range,
high endurance UASs. The setup included two monitors, the primary of which portrayed the
Tactical Situation Display (TSD). The TSD included a topographical image of the operating
environment, highlighted routes including waypoints, critical targets, other intruding aircraft, and
the Mission Mode Indicators (MMI). The secondary monitor displayed the Image Management
Display (IMD) which includes an image cue and image display used for target acquisition.
Figure 5 shows the MIIIRO interface.

sum

Figure 5. MIIIRO Testbed Display. Left: Tactical Situation Display (TSD); Right: Image
Management Display (IMD)

Design
A 2x2 within subjects, fully factorial design was used for the study. The independent
variables were target uncertainty and time pressure. Target uncertainty consisted of high
uncertainty images, those with an equal number of distracters similar to the target, and low
uncertainty images which will contain either all targets or all distracters. The uncertainty that
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this study attempted to elicit is based on probability. With a mix of half targets and half
distracters, the probability of making an incorrect distinction is 50%. With either strictly
distracters or strictly targets, the probability of making an incorrect distinction is lowered,
thereby reducing uncertainty. A management by exception strategy was utilized to create tiome
pressure for the primary task. The time pressure consisted of either three or six second time
limits during the target acquisition task. These times were determined through a small pilot
study involving two Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Unixersity students, xvhich yielded a mean
image processing time of lL)53ms. It xxas determined that a three second time limit xvould
provide adequate time pressure, while a six second time limit xxas long enough to provide little to
no time pressure. Dependant measures collected were xvorkload, image processing time, and
accuracy for the primary task. Workload was subjectively reported by participants, while
accuracy and image processing time were objectively measured by the MIIIRO softxvare.
Secondary task measures xvere also taken by the MIIIRO softxvare, and will be described later.
Refer to Table 1 for a graphical depiction of the experimental design.

Table 1
Time Pressure
(seconds)
3
Loxv

Task Uncertainty
High

30

6
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Primary

Task

The primary task during this study was target acquisition. The UAS utilized a high lexel of
autonomy and did not require the participant to directly control flight. Preset waypoints made up
the flight path which the UAS followed. Along the flight path, 10 image capture locations were
preset and images xvere presented to the participants associating each image capture location
with a target acquisition. The participants were required to view the images collected by the
aircraft, and verify that the Automatic Target Recognizer (ATR) had correctly selected the
targets. Each image contained at least one ground vehicle, but a target was not alxvays present.
Distracters were present in some of the images as well, and were discernable from the targets by
a combination of color, shade, and hue. The ATR placed a red box around the vehicles it had
recognized as targets, although the ATR xvas not alxvays correct, and sometimes placed the red
box around distracters while not placing one around the targets. The reliability of the ATR was
set to S()°o in order to make sure the participant was verifying that targets had been correctly
selected. In cases where the ATR had incorrectly designated targets and distracters, the
participant xvas required to manually select and deselect the images by clicking on the images
with the mouse. The automation processed the images as is, without participant input, if no
action was taken within the time limit.

Primary task performance measures were automatically collected by the MIIIRO softxvare.
These measures included image processing time and target selection accuracy.

Secondary

Task

There were three secondary tasks that the participants were required to perform during this
experiment. The first task consisted of processing Intruder Aircraft (IA) which entered the
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operational airspace. This task was used to imitate unexpected aircraft which may enter airspace
during typical UAS operation, which is a highly critical situation, and requires a quick and
attentive response. The IA was depicted by a red aircraft shaped icon appearing on the display at
random times during the experiment. This event occurred twice for each trial, and resulted in the
participant being required to click on the aircraft and enter a predetermined code.
The second task involved the MMI, which was represented by three round lights organized in
a line, similar to a horizontal stoplight, displayed on the TSD. The MMI indicated the status of
the UAS by lighting up the green, yellow, or red light xxhich indicate a state of good health,
action needed, and urgent action needed, respectively. In order to correct the situation in the
event that the yellow or red lights are illuminated, the participant needed to click on the light
panel and correctly tvpe in a text string which was presented to the participant via a pop up
window after initiating the action. Once the text string xvas entered correctly, the MMI returned
to a state of good health and illuminated the green light.
The third task in this experiment required the participant to respond to flight path change
recommendations made by the automation. "Pop-up threats" were designed into the flight path.
but x\ ere not visible to the participant until the aircraft had encountered them. When this
occurred, the automation made a recommendation on a route change to axoid the threat, and the
participant was required to acknowledge and accept the recommended change before it xxas put
into effect. The route changes recommended were not alxvays necessary, so the participant had
the ability to reject the route change in favor of the original flight plan if they decided to do so.
Data for all three of the additional tasks was automatical!}' collected by the MIIIRO software and
included the number of events and response times for all MMI, IA, and pop-up threat
occurrences.
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A NASA-TLX rating scale was utilized to measure the participants' workload (Hart &
Staxeland, 1988). The NASA-TLX measure provided an overall workload score based on a
weighted average of six subscales which include mental demands, physical demands, temporal
demands, performance effort, and frustration.
Procedure

Once each participant arrixed at the lab, they were asked to fill out the consent form
(Appendix A) and biographical questionnaire (Appendix B). The participant xvas then
introduced to the NASA-TLX questionnaire (Appendix C), and it was explained to them how to
fill out the form. There xvas then an introduction to the MIIIRO simulator and the participants
were informed of the purpose of the experiment. Familiarization with the simulator included an
instructional session with a hands-on training exercise which covered all possible events that
occurred during the actual experiment and lasted fixe minutes. If the participant had any
questions, the}' xvere answered at this time.
After the participants had been briefed and completed the training session, they began the
experiment and no additional help was available to them. Each participant completed all of the
scenarios, the order of which xvas randomized xvith regards to time pressure and image
uncertainty to avoid any learning effects. Each trial lasted approximately seven minutes and
immediately following the trial the participants filled out the xvorkload questionnaire. Once this
was completed, the participants were debriefed and anv further questions were answered. Once
the entire study was completed, the highest performing participant was contacted to receive

sioo.
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Results
The current study was intended to investigate the effect of time pressure and task
uncertainty on autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle operator workload and task performance.
Repeated measures ANOVA s xvere used to analyze each of the effect each independent xariable
had on the dependant variables: image processing time, image accuracy, MMI processing time,
IA processing time, pop-up threat processing time, and workload measured by NASA-TLX. An
alpha value of 0.05 was used to determine significance.
Image Processing Time
There were two primary task performance measures collected during this study. The first
of these xvas image processing time, and the second was image accuracy. Hypothesis 2 stated
that high task uncertainty would result in lower primary task performance measures, which in
this case means higher image processing times and lower image accuracy. Hypothesis 5 stated
that a lower time limit would increase the time pressure on the participants and result in lower
image accuracy. The means and standard dev iations for image processing time are presented in
Table 2. To test these hypotheses, an ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was any
significant difference between the scenarios w ith regard to image processing time and image
accuracy. The results of the ANOVA for image processing time are presented first, and are
shown in Table 3.
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Means and Standard Deviations for Ima^e Processing Times (ms
95° <> Confidence Interval

Time Pressure

Uncertainty

Mean

Standard Dev.

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

High

2253.92

49.67

2152.33

2355.51

Low

2745.32

98.80

2543.25

2947.39

High

2417.57

77.67

2258.72

2576.42

Low

2581.67

72.29

2433.82

2729.51

Table 3
ANOVA Source Table for Image Processing Time (ms)
Source

SS

df

MS

Uncertainty

807864.30

i

807864.30

Time Pressure

7244218.80

1

Time Pressure*
Uneertaint}

1960963.33

Error (Uneertaint})
Error (Time
Pressure)

/'

p

Power

5^57

.025-

.626

7244218.80

35.64

.000*

1

1

1960963.33

9.28

.005*

.838

4205627.20

29

145021.63

5894608.70

29

203262.37

*p< .05.
The effect of uncertainty on image processing time was examined first. These means
differed significantly at F( 1,29)^5.571, p=.025. An observed power of 0.626 gives backing to
these results. As shown in Figure 6, low task uneertaint}' produced longer image processing
times than high task uncertainty, contradicting the prediction made in hypothesis 2.
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Image Processing Time (ms)
3000

"2581.67

2417.57

2500
|?

2000

^

1500

|

1000
500 0

•

Low Task Uncertainty

;

.

-

High Task Uncertainty

Figure 6. Uncertainty effect on image processing time
The effect of time pressure on image processing time was also analyzed. These means
differed significantly at F( 1,29)=35.64, p= 000. An observed power of 1.0 adds backing to this
finding. The results are shown in Figure 7.

Image Processing Time (ms)
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Figure 7. Time pressure effect on image processing time
In addition to the main effects reported previously, there was a significant interaction
between time pressure and uncertainty for image processing time. The means and standard
deviations are presented in Table 4.
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of Time Pressure and Uncertainty on Image
Processing Time (ms)
95% Confidence Interval
Time Pressure

Uncertainty

Mean

Standard
Dev.

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

High

High

2299.70

47.40

2202.77

2396.63

Low

2208.13

64.69

2075.82

2340.45

High

2535.43

132.81

2263.80

2807.07

Low

2955.20

110.74

2728.72

3181.68

Low

This interaction was found to be significant at F(l,29)=9.28, p=005. The significance of
this mteraction indicates that at high time pressure, uncertainty has less of an effect than at low
time pressure. The results of this interaction arc shown in Figure 8.
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H— High Uncertainty

2000
Low Time Pressure

High Time Pressure

Figure 8. Time pressure by uncertainty image processing time

linage Accuracy
Image accuracy is the second of two primary task performance measures collected during
the study. Again, hypothesis 2 stated that high task uncertainty would result in lower image
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accuracy and hypothesis 5 stated that a lower time limit would increase the time pressure on the
participants resulting in lower image accuracy. The means and standard deviations for image
accuracy are presented in Table 5, and the results of the ANOVA are presented in Table 6.
Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for linage Accuracy (°«>)
95° o Confidence Interval

Time Pressure

Uncertainty

Mean

Standard Dev.

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

High

S4.67

2.31

79.94

89.39

Low

S4.35

2.05

80.17

88.53

High

92.67

1.24

90.13

95.20

Low

76.35

3.18

69.86

82.84

Table 6
ANOVA Source Table for Image Accuracy ("»)
SS

df

MS

/

/'

Power

Uncertainty

7987.01

1

7987.01

3C).98

.000*

1

Time Pressure

3.01

1

3.01

.041

.842

.054

Time Pressure*
Uncertainty

11^7.01

1

1197.01

18.73

.000*

.987

Error (Uneertaint))

5793.24

29

199.77

Error (Time
Pressure)

2147.24

29

74.04

Source

*/?<.05.
The effect of time pressure on image accuracx was anah/ed, and the means did not
demonstrate a significant difference at F( L2 C )HU)41. p=.S42. thus hypothesis 5 is not supported
for image accuracx. The means for uncertainty differed significantly at F( 1.2L))-3e)»S.p=.()()0.
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Hypothesis 2 stated that high uncertainty would result in lower image accuracy, which is
contradicted by these results, shown in Figure 9.

Image Accuracy(%)
92.67

Figure 9. Uncertainty effect on image accuracy
A significant interaction was also found for image accuracy F(l,29)=18.73, p=.000. The
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 7, and the interaction is shown in Figure
10.
Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of Time Pressure and Uncertainty on Image
Accuracy (%)
95% Confidi:nce Interval
Lower Bound

Upper Bound

89.67

Standard
Dev.
1.89

85.81

93.53

Low

79.67

3.54

72.43

86.91

High

73.03

3.20

66.50

79.57

Low

95.67

1.24

93.13

98.20

Time Pressure

U icertainty

Mean

High

High

Low
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Image Accuracy (%)
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03

70

High Uncertainty

60
50
Low Time Pressure

High Time Pressure

Figure 10. Time Pressure by uncertainty image accuracy
MMI Processing Time
In addition to the primary task perfonnance measures, there were also three secondary
perfonnance measures collected during this study. These secondary task performance measures
include MMI processing time, IA processing time, and the pop-up threat processing time.
Hypothesis 3 stated that high task uncertainty would result in lower secondary task performance
measures, which in this case means higher processing times for all secondary tasks. Hypothesis
6 stated that a lower time limit would result in higher performance on secondary tasks, meaning
lower processing times on all secondary tasks. Hypothesis 8 also stated an interaction to occur
between time limit and task uncertainty with regards to secondary task performance. To test
these hypotheses, an ANOVA was conducted for each secondary task. MMI processing time
was analyzed first. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 8, followed by the
ANOVA results presented in Table 9.
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Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations for MMI Processiim Time (ms)
05° <> Confidence Interval

Time Pressure

Uncertainty

Mean

Standard De\.

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

High

7984.90

366.08

7236.19

8733.61

Low

8227.78

365.13

7481.01

8974.55

High

8054.55

359.81

7318.66

8790.44

Low

8158.13

365.68

7410.23

8906.04

Table 9
ANOVA Source Table for MMI Processing Time (ms)
Source

SS

df'

MS

?

/?

Power

Uneertaint}

321885.21

i

321885.21

232

^33

.075

Time Pressure

1769769.41

1

1769769.41

1.083

.307

.172

Time Pressure*
Uncertainty

1.023xc7

1

1.023\e7

7.156

.012*

.734

Error (Uncertainty)

4.019xe7

29

1385793.62

Error (Time
Pressuie)

4.74()xe7

2^

1634403.10

*/>< .05.
The means for the effect of uncertainty on MMI processing time did not differ
simiificantlv at F( 1,29)=.232, p^.633. which does not support hypothesis 3. The means for the
effect of time pressure on MMI processing time also did not differ significantly at
F( 1.29)—1.083. p=.307. which does not support hypothesis 6. An interaction between time
pressure and uneertaint} however, was found to be significant at F( 1.29)= 7.1 56. p - 0 1 2 . with an
obsened power of .734. The means and standard dex iations for this interaction are presented in
Table 10, and the results are shown in Figure 11.
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Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of Time Pressure and Uncertainty on MMI
Processing Time (ms)
95% Confidence Interval
Time Pressure

Uncertainty

Mean

Standard
Dev.

Lowrer Bound

Upper Bound

High

High

8225.13

397.95

7411.23

9039.03

Low

7744.67

412.17

6901.69

8587.64

High

7883.97

368.21

7130.90

8637.03

Low

8571.60

405.83

7741.58

9401.62

Low

MMI Processing Time (ms)
9000
_

8500

Jk»E571.fi
^

* ' ^ W ^ - - - - B * 8225.13

E

-; — Low Uncertainty

CD

E

^ >

8000

7744.67
f§—• High Uncertainty

7500
7000

Low Time Pressure

High Time Pressure

Figure 11. Time pressure by uncertainty MMI processing time

IA Processing Time
The next secondary task measure presented here is IA processing time. Hypothesis 3
stated that high task uncertainty would result in higher IA processing times, while hypothesis 6
stated that a lower time limit would result in lower IA processing times. Hypothesis 8 also stated
an interaction to occur between time limit and task uncertainty with regards to IA processing
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times. The means and standard deviations for IA processing time are presented in Table 1 1, and
the ANOVA table for IA processing time is presented in Table 12.
Table 11
Means and Standard Deviations for IA Processing Time (ms)
95"o Confidence Inter\al
Mean

Standard Dex.

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

High

6357.40

314.51

5714.15

7000.65

Low

5825.08

295.65

5220.41

6429.76

High

5753.38

261.21

5219.16

6287.61

Low

6429.10

380.50

5650.89

7207.31

Time Pressure

Uncertainty

Table 12
ANOVA Source Table for IA Processing Time (ms)
Source

SS

df'

MS

/

~p

Power

Uncertainty

1.370\c7

1

1.370\c7

25\

424

.334

Time Pressure

8500831.01

1

8500831.01

2.20

.148

.300

Time Pressure*

1.325xc7

1

1.325\c7

2.915

.098

.379

1.583xe8

29

5458427.56

3857586.92

29

3857586 92

Uncertainty
Error (Uneertaint))
Error (Time
Pressure)
* p< .05.

The main effect of uncertainty on IA processing time was not found to be significant at
F( 1,29)=2.5 1, p= 1 24, which does not support hypothesis 3 The main effect of time pressure on
IA processing time was also not found to be significant at F( L29)=2.20. p-.14N which does not
support lnpothesis 6. Lastly, the interaction of time pressure and uneertaint} was also not found
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to be significant at F( 1,29)^2.915, p=. 098, and thus does not support hypothesis 8. The means
and standard deviations for this interaction are presented in Table 13.
Table 13
Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of Time Pressure and Uncertainty on IA
Processing Time (ms)
95°u Confidence Interval
Time Pressure

Uncertainty

Mean

Standard
Dew

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Hi eh

High

6351.87

3X9.51

5555.24

7148.50

Low

6362.93

459.87

5422.40

7303.47

High

5154.90

289.77

4562.25

5747.55

Low

6495.27

508.90

5454.44

7536.09

Low

Pop-up Threat Processing Time
The last secondary task measure collected in the current study is pop-up threat processing
time. This measure is the time taken to respond to a recommended flight path change due to a
threat which pops-up during the simulation. In the same fashion as the other sccondai) tasks,
hxpothesis 3 stated that high task uneertaint} would result in higher pop-up threat processing
times, hypothesis 6 stated that a lower time limit would result in lower pop-up threat processing
times, and hypothesis 8 also stated an interaction to occur between time limit and task
uncertainty with regards to pop-up threat processing times. The means and standard deviations
are presented in Table 14, and the ANOVA table for pop-up threat processing time is presented
in Table 15.
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Table 14
Moans and Standard Dc\ iations for Pop-up Threat Processing Time (ins)
95"(i Confidence Interval

Time Pressure

Uncertainty

Mean

Standard Dev.

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

High

2896.28

150.53

2588.42

3204.15

Low

2966.98

109.36

2743.33

3190.64

High

2776.58

124.31

2522.35

3030.82

Low

3086.68

125.77

2829.45

3343.91

Table 15
ANOVA Source Table for Pop-up Threat Processing Time (ms)
Source

SS

Jf

MS

/

p

Pow er

Uncertainty

2884860.30

i

2884860.30

6.306

.018*

.680

Time Pressure

149954.70

1

149954.70

.228

.637

.075

Time Pressure*
Uncertainty

4247298.13

1

4247298.13

6.941

.013*

.721

Error (Uncertainty)

1.327xe7

29

457485.27

Error (Time
Pressuie)

1.909xe7

29

658290.08

*/><.()5.
The main effect for time pressure on pop-up threat processing time did not show
simiificance at F( 1,29)-.22K. p=.637, thus not supporting hypothesis 6. The main effect for
uncertainty on pop-up threat processing time did show a significant difference at F( 1.29)=6.306.
p-.018, and an obsened power of .680 lends some support to the results. These results
contradict the prediction made by hypothesis 3. that high uncertainty would lead to higher
processing times.

The results are shown in Figure 12.
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Pop-up Threat Processing Time (ms)
3400
_

y

3200

- 3086.68

J. 3000 •
g

277^.58

2800 j-

*~ 2600 H

:-;;•;•;;'•.•.••,,••/•:/.':

2400
Low Task Uncertainty

High Task Uncertainty

I

Figure 12. Uncertainty effect on pop-up threat processing time
Additionally, an interaction between time pressure and uncertainty was found to have
significance for pop-up threat processing time at F(l,29)=6.941, p=.013. These results contradict
the prediction made by hypothesis 8. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table
16, and the interaction is shown in Figure 13.
Table 16
Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of Time Pressure and Uncertainty on Pop-up
Threat Processing Time (ms)
95% Confidei ice Interval
Lower Bound

Upper Bound

2553.10

Standard
Dev.
189.78

2164.95

2941.25

Low

3239.47

180.27

2870.77

3608.16

High

3000.07

138.99

2715.80

3284.34

Low

2933.90

130.57

2666.86

3200.95

Time Pressure

Uncertainty

Mean

High

High

Low
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Pop-up Threat Processing Time (ms)
3500 -|—
—

^ • * — — • 3239.47

JE 3000
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H
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2000
Low Time Pressure
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Figure 13. Time pressure by uncertainty pop-up threat processing time
Workload
Workload was measured subjectively using the NASA-TLX after each scenario. The
subjective ratings were on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest level of
workload and 0 being the lowest. Hypotheses 1, 4, and 7 refer to workload. Hypothesis 1 stated
that high uncertainty would result in higher workload ratings, and hypothesis 4 stated that high
time pressure would also result in higher workload ratings. Hypothesis 7 stated that an
interaction would exist between time pressure and uncertainty with regards to workload, and that
uncertainty will have less of an effect on workload for scenarios presenting high time pressure
than for scenarios presenting low time pressure. The means and standard deviations for
workload are presented in Table 1 7, and the ANOVA table for workload is presented in Table
18.
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Table 17
Means and Standard Dex iations for Workload
95" <> Confidence Intenal

Time Pressure

Uncertainty

Mean

Standard Dew

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

High

44.25

3.23

37.64

50.86

Low

38.72

3.30

31.97

45.46

High

41.12

2.96

3 5.OK

47.17

Low

41.85

3.44

34.82

48.87

Table 18
ANOVA Source Table for Workload
Source

SS

<//'

MS

/

p

Power

Uncertainty

15.66

1

15.66

2MJ9

jsTl

.073

Time Pressure

918.59

1

918.59

7.512

.010*

.755

Time Pressure*
Uncertainty

37.02

1

37.02

.263

.612

.079

Error (Uncertainty)

2168.10

29

74.76

Error (Time
Pressure)

3546.26

29

122.29

* p< .05.
The main effect for uncertainty did not show a significant difference at F( 1.29)=.209,
p—.65 1. The effect of time pressure on workload did show significance at F( L29)=7.512. p—.01.
With an observed power of.755, these results lend support to hypothesis 4, that high time
pressure would produce higher workload. The means and standard deviations for the interaction
of time pressure and uncertainty on workload are presented in Table 19. This interaction did not
produce significant results at F( 1,29)-.263. p-.612. which does not support hxpothesis ~\ The
results for the effect of time pressure on workload are presented on Figure 14.
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Table 19
Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of Time Pressure and Uncertainty on
Workload
95% Confidence Interval
Time Pressure

Uncertainty

Mean

Standard
Dev.

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

High

High

44.44

3.20

37.90

50.98

Low

44.06

3.97

35.94

52.17

High

37.80

3.36

30.92

44.68

Low

39.63

3.54

32.39

46.88

Low

Figure 14. Time pressure effect on workload

Discussion
The objective of this study was to examine the effect of time pressure and task
uncertainty on operator task performance and workload when conducting an unmanned aerial
vehicle operation. This study was intended to advance current knowledge about the workload
associated with operating a highly autonomous UAS, particularly with technology which can
provide uncertainty during tasks, and during operations which are extremely time sensitive. The

46

aim is to provide knowledge which can be applied to the design of future UAS's in order to
improve operator performance through appropriate levels of workload. This knowledge
potentialK' includes the amount of uncertainty an operator can deal with while still maintaining a
high level of performance, as well as what level of time pressure the operator can handle before
performance begins to deteriorate. The results of this study are discussed here, organized into
three main areas of interest: primary task performance measures, secondary task performance
measures, and workload.
Primary Task Performance Measures
There were two primary task performance measures collected during this study: image
processing time and image accuracy. Image processing time showed significance for both level
of uncertainty and time pressure. There was also found to be a significant interaction of time
pressure and uncertainty with regards to image processing time. Low uncertainty images
produced higher image processing times than high uncertainty images. This directly contradicts
predictions made about uncertainty and image processing time. It was expected that the more
uncertainty an image contained, based on probability, the more time it would take the participant
to process that image. It is possible that the different images created different scanning patterns
within the participants, and the time it took to scan the images created a difference in processing
time. Another possible explanation for these results involves the type of uncertainty chosen as a
variable. Uncertainty as a probability simply claims that if 100% of the items displayed on the
image are either targets or distracters, there will be little uncertainty about which the\ are.
Images that display 50% targets and 50% distracters would constitute higher uncertainty for the
participant. This ma\ not be an accurate representation of uneertaint)' when making quick
decisions during this stuck. When viewing images which contain both targets and distracters. it

47

may be easier to determine a difference between the two with onl\ a quick glance, due to the
immediate comparison available. When viewing images with strictly targets or strictly
distracters, there is no immediate comparison available, making it necessary to examine the
image more closely. This is discussed further in the Recommendations for Further Research
section.

There was also significance found for time pressure on image processing time. Low time
pressure produced longer image processing times than high time pressure. The fact that the
participants were under more time pressure to process the images possibly led them to hurry
when performing this task. This may negatively affect the accuracy of their responses, but the
image processing time would decrease in this case.
The interaction of time pressure and uneertaint)' showed significant results for image
processing time as well. High uncertainty images were processed faster than low uncertainty
images at low time pressures, but processed slower at high time pressures. In other words, the
effect of time pressure showed a greater change for low uncertainty images than for high
uncertainty images. This interaction was not hypothesized to be significant, but a possible
explanation for this occurrence is related to the previous statement about the nature of the
uncertainty of the images used. When not pressured for time, participants may have been able to
more carefully examine the images which did not contain a direct comparison within them.
When under a more stringent time constraint, participants may have resorted to guessing.
resulting in lower processing times. Reynolds (2009) came to a similar conclusion, and
theorized that for processing non-obvious images, participants may simply guess.
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The other primary performance measure collected during this study was image accuracy.
There was a significant interaction found between time pressure and uncertainty for image
accuracy. Uncertainty demonstrated a stronger effect at low time pressure than at high time
pressure. This, again, may support the argument that images which have both targets and
distracters provide a direct comparison, and lead to higher accuracy. There was also significance
found tor the main effect of uncertainty on image accuracy. Low uncertainty images yielded a
lower accuracy score than high uncertainty images, which contradicts hypothesis 2, but may
support the previously stated argument that when participants have no immediate comparisons
available to them, the uncertainty may actually increase.
SccondaiT Task Performance Measures
Secondary task measures were used as another measure of workload, attempting to
determine how much excess capacity was axailable while performing the primary task. There
were three secondary task performance measures involved in the current study: MMI processing
time. IA processing time, and pop-up threat processing time. Overall, the main effects of the
secondary task measures did not agree with the subjective workload ratings from the NASATLX. The secondaiy task measures showed no significance for the effect of time pressure while
the workload ratings did show significance. Uneertaint)' did show a significant main effect for
two of the three secondaiy tasks, while not showing a significant effect on the subjective ratings.
This may indicate that the secondary task measures were not an adequate measure of excess
capacit) as intended, or that the NASA-TLX is simply a more sensitive measure.
MMI processing required the participants to respond to either a yellow or red light within
the indicator, by clicking on the light and typing in a number string gi\en to them. MMI
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processing time showed no significant results for the main effects of either time pressure or
uncertainty. This lack of significance does not support hypotheses 3 or 6, which both stated an
ettect on secondary performance measures due to uncertainty and time pressure respectively.
The interaction of the two however, was shown to contain significance. Again, at low time
pressure, scenarios with low uncertainty produced higher MMI processing times than scenarios
with high uncertainty, and the opposite is true at high time pressure. Due to the participants
being instRicted that image processing should be given priority over secondary tasks, it is exident
that when participants take longer to process the images, as in the case of the low uncertainty
images, secondary task performance is affected. This may be an explanation which fits the data
for the interaction, given the data for image processing time, as it contains the same pattern of
interaction.

IA processing required the participants to respond to a red aircraft icon which would
appear on the tactical situation display, by clicking on the icon and typing in a code gixen to
them. IA processing time yielded no significant differences for effect of time pressure,
uncertainty, or their interaction. This again, does not support either hypothesis 3 or 6 for
performance on secondary task measures. A possible explanation for this lack of significance is
the number of IA e\ cuts experienced during the trials. For MMI events, performance w as
affected more by primary task because each scenario contained ten instances of MMI events.
This led to more chances for the tasks to overlap and have an effect. IA events on the other
hand, occurred only twice per trial. With such a few opportunities for the tasks to conflict, the
uncertainty and time pressure placed on the primary task had little chance to affect performance
on IA piocessing.
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The last secondary task measure collected was pop-up threat processing time. Pop-up
threat processing required the participants to either accept or reject a recommended flight path
change in order to avoid a threat which had appeared during the simulation. Uncertainty
demonstrated a significant effect on pop-up threat processing time, with low uncertainty
resulting in greater processing times than high uncertainty. There was also an interaction
between uncertainty and time pressure which demonstrated significance. This time however, the
pattern of the interaction is the opposite of interactions on other tasks. At low time pressure,
high uncertainty scenarios produced higher processing times than low uncertainty scenarios, and
vice versa for high time pressure. This may be due to the nature of the task involved with
processing a pop-up threat, which is something that may require further study. The effect of the
interaction is greater for high time pressure than for low time pressure, which is in contrast with
hypothesis 8.

Workload
Workload was assessed using subjective ratings from the NASA-TLX after each trial.
The main effect of uneertaint)' was not shown to be significant on subjective workload ratings.
which contradicts hypothesis 1. The interaction of time pressure and uneertaint)' also failed to
show significance, in contrast with hypothesis 7 The lack of significance for uncertainty, as
well as the interaction of time pressure and uncertainty, does not support the argument that lack
of direct comparison played a role in how the participants dealt with the images at different time
pressures. This idea will be discussed further in Recommendations for Further Research section.
Time pressure however, did show significance for the mam effect on subjective workload. High
time pressure produced higher ratings of subjective workload among the participants, which
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supports hypothesis 4. Pre\ ious studies using a timeout feature for management by exception
have not shown any significance for subjective workload, and it was theorized that participants
were not utilizing the timeout feature because the time limit was too long (Reynolds, 2009). This
was the basis for the current study, to limit the time the participant had to respond to the images
in order to create greater time pressure associated with the task, and determine how this would
affect workload. These results demonstrated that workload can be increased by implementing a
more stringent time pressure during an image identification task.
Study

Limitations

This study was based on previous research using the MIIIRO test bed (Liu, Wasson, &
Yinccnzi, 2008: Reynolds, 2009). The previous studies showed difficult)' in manipulating
workload through lexel of automation, and quality of images was reasoned to be a possible
explanation for this. The current study set out to in\ estigate whether image uncertainty could
contribute to operator workload. In attempting to define uncertainty however, sexeral
possibilities arose as methods for manipulating uncertainty. The method chosen was based on
probability, that is. if an image contains strictly targets, the participant has no chance of
erroneously selecting a distracter, leax ing little uncertainty. If the image however, contains half
targets and half distracters, the participant has only a 50% chance of making the correct
selection, leading to high uneertaint)'. This method of eliciting uneertaint) max' haxe been biased
due to the nature of the images being presented. The images used were very low resolution
pictures of tanks against a generic background. This led to the potential for participants to
mistake two targets or two distracters as opposites when there xxas no actual difference available
for immediate comparison. The confound is that adding the distracters to the targets may
facilitate target selection.
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Additionally, the time pressure applied to this study may haxe contributed to differences
in image processing time betxveen scenarios. The pilot study found a mean image processing
time ot 1953ms, and it xvas determined that three seconds would provide a high enough time
pressure to elicit a xvorkload response. By allowing the simulation to time out images after three
seconds however, there is potential for ceiling effects to occur. If participants were unable to
respond to the images before the time limit passed, true performance on image processing time
may not have been collected. This could occur if the participant xvas processing a secondary task
when an image was presented to them. The average amount of images which were allowed to
time out through all four trials xvas less than nine percent, but there is still potential for image
processing time to be misrepresented.

Practical

Implications

The future of UAS operation, both abroad and within national airspace, holds many
opportunities. The tasks xxhich can be performed more safely and efficiently by an unmanned
vehicle are numerous, but in order to implement the use of UAS"s for these tasks, more needs to
be done to assess the capabilities and limitations of the systems. Factors that influence xvorkload
in a UAS operator need to be further understood in order to avoid performance detriments due to
workload which is either too high or too low.
Time pressure plays such an integral role in determining how well a task can be
performed, particularly a complex task such as UAS operation. It w ill be important to
understand factors which increase time pressure, and be able to alleviate some of those factors, if
UASN are to be implemented for some of the tasks for which they haxe so much potential. It
w ill be necessary to understand when and how to best assist a UAS operator in order to axoid the

cttects of time pressure. This is also true for the uncertainty of tasks often performed by UAS
operators. An understanding of how uncertainty affects performance, as well as how it affects
xvorkload, can contribute to methods of alleviating uncertainty through things such as automated
decision assistance. This study demonstrated a significant effect of uneertaint)' on processing
times for images as well as secondary tasks. The time differences however xvere small enough
that they may not warrant any design changes. Though statistically significant, in a practical
manner, the time differences may be negligible outside of life and death situations. This is a
topic which needs to be studied further, and reviewed before implementing design strategies.
Recommendations for Further Research
Highly autonomous vehicles, like the one simulated for this study, can open the door for
one operator to supervise multiple vehicles at the same time. The xvorkload involved with
supervising multiple UAS's is unknown, but with knowledge about the factors xxhich influence
workload with one UAS, future research can focus on implementing these factors xvith multiple
UAS's to determine how many vehicles one person can supervise. Future research may want to
include time pressure as a factor when assessing performance while operating more than one
vehicle.
There is a lot of uncertainty involved with UAS operation, due to the operator being
separated from the vehicle and the environment it is in. Because of the increased level of
uncertainty in UAS operation in comparison to manned flight, uncertainty is still a concept
which can provide insight into performance and workload during UAS flight. The definition of
uncertainty used in this study led to unexpected results, possiblv due to the ability of participants
to compare images directly. Future research should focus on uncertainty in a different manner in
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order to provide a clearer definition of factors which contribute to it. By further understanding
uncertainty when conducting UAS operations, designs can be implemented to reduce the
uneertaint)' which contributes to higher workload and lower performance.
Conclusion
The role of UAS's w ithin the military has grown considerably in the last decade, and can
do the same within the national airspace in the near future. The capabilities of UAS's provide a
much safer and efficient method for performing a number of tasks. There are still a number of
concerns with regard to safety of UAS flight which need to be addressed before the full potential
of this technology can be realized. The traditional method of dealing with human factors
concerns, is to design the human out of the loop, and rely completely on automation. This
method does not erase human factors concerns however, but merely creates new problems which
must be solved. It is important to understand the human component of these sv stems. and be
able to solve some of the issues through design which provides the abilitv' for all components of
the system to perform at optimum levels. It will remain important for studies such as this one.
continue to be conducted to improve the design of UAS's in order to further the use of the
technology.
This study has contributed to the knowledge of UAS operation, and the factors which
mav influence performance and workload within the UAS operator. Significant workload effects
were shown to be elicited by time pressure, as well as effects on performance. While uncertainty
still remains an area of little understanding, future research can investigate different vvavs to
implement uneertaint)' in order to ascertain the effects it may have on UAS operators. It will be
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important for future research to apply the findings of this study to more complex tasks involving
multiple unmanned vehicles, as well as other tasks for which UAS\s may prove useful.
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Appendix A
IRB Number: 10-302
Informed Consent Form
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Time Pressure and Task Uncertainty Study

Conducted by Trevor Peterson
Advisor: Dr. Dahai Liu
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
600 S. Clyde Moms Blvd, Daytona Beach, FL 32114
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of time pressure and task uncertainty on
performance and workload. This experiment consists of one session that will last approximately
forty five minutes. During this session, you will be asked to complete a computer-based UAS
simulation trial and fill out a questionnaire regarding your perceived feeling of workload.
Your participation in this study will help us determine an appropriate level of automation
and help distinguish potential pilot candidates for future UASs. There are no known risks
associated with this experiment. The data collected from your participation will remain
confidential. You will be compensated for your participation with extra credit in an
undergraduate course and will be eligible to receive a SI00.00 cash prize for best overall
performance. You may terminate your participation at any time.
Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions, please ask during the
experiment, or call Trevor Peterson at 970.988.9410 or Dr. Dahai Liu at 386.226.6214
Statement of Consent
I acknowledge that my participation m this experiment is entirely voluntary and
that I am free to withdraw at any time. I have been informed as to the general scientific purposes
of the experiment and that I will receive extra credit for participation in this studv and will be
eligible to receive SI00.00 in the event that I have the best overall task performance in the entire
study. Prize money is contingent on completion of the study.
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional information regarding
the study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full satisfaction.
I hav e read and fully understand the consent form and I sign it freely and v oluntanK .
Participant's Name:
Participant's Signature: _ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ _

Date

Experimenter Signature:

Date
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Appendix B
Biographical Information Questionnaire
I.D.#:

Task:

Date:

Please fill in the blanks or circle the appropriate response.
1. What is your age?

years

2. What is your gender? M / F
3. Do you have normal or corrected to 20,20 vision? Yes / No
4. Are you color blind? Yes / No
5. Are you: R-handed / L handed
6. How many hours per w eek do you use computers:
7

hours

On a scale of 1 to 5. what is your confidence level in using computers:
LOW confidence

1

2

3

4

5

HIGH confidence

8. On average, how many hours per week do you spend playing computer games'7
0-5

6-10

11-13

16-20

21-25+

9. What type of genre of gaming are \ou most accustomed to playing?
Action

Adventure

Role-Playing

Strategy

Simulation
10. Have vou had any other experience participating in unmanned aircraft simulation'7 Yes /
No
1 1. Do you have anv experience fl\ mg unmanned aircraft or remote controlled aircraft? Yes '
No
If so, please explain:

.
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Appendix C
NASA Task Load Index (TLX) Form (Presented after the completion of each trial)
^ are interested in your subjective experience of workload Workload is a difficult concept to define precisely.
"jut a simple one to understand generally. The factors that influence vour experience of workload may come from
ie task itself, your teehngs about vour own performance, how much effort \ou put in, or the stress and frustration
vou telt.
C nc way to find out about workload is to ask people to describe the feelings they experienced Because workload
may be caused by many different factors, we would like vou to evaluate several of them indiv iduallv rather than
lumping them into a single global evaluation of overall workload This set of six rating scales was developed for
you to use in ev atuatmg your experiences during the test trial.
Please indicate the level of workload you experienced on each of the 6 scales by circling the line at the point
which best reflects the level of workload vou experienced. The ends of the scales are labeled to indicate very low
and very high workload. Points in between those end points represent intermediate values of workload. Please
note that the Performance scale goes from Good on the left to Bad on the right This order has been c on fusing for
some people.
EFFORT — 1 low hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to accomplish your level of performance?

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I I

Low

High

PERFORMANCE — 1 low successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals of the task set by the
experimenter (or yourself) 0 How satisfied were you with vour performance in accomplishing these goals'*

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

Good

i
Poor

FRUSTRATION LEVEL — How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed versus secure, gratified,
content, relaxed, and complacent did vou feel during the task?

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I I

Low

Ni«h

TEMPORAL DEMAND — How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the tasks or
events occurred'? Was the pace slow and leisurelv. or rapid and frantic?

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I I

Low

High

MENTAL DEMAND — How much mental and perceptual activ ity was required (e.g . thinking, deciding.
calculating, remembering, looking, searching) 9 Was the task easy or demanding, simple or complex, forgiv mg or
exacting °

|

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

Low

I
Nitfh

PHVSICAL DEMAND
llow much phvsical activitv was required (e.g.. pushing, pulling, turning, controlling.
activating)'? Was the task ph\sicallv easy or demanding, slow oi brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or laborious?

|
Low

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I
Mi^h
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NASA Task Load Index (TLX) Weighting Form
ie forms you filled out included six rating scale factors that can influence workload. We are interested in your
assessment of the relative contribution of these factors to your experience of workload.
eople van' in their opinion of what contributes to workload. For example, some people feel that mental or
temporal demands are the essential aspects of workload regardless of the effort they expended or the performance
they achieved. Others feel that if they performed well, the workload must have been low and if they performed
poorly, the workload must have been high. Yet others feel that effort or feelings of frustration are the most
important factors in workload, and so on.
In addition, the factors that create lev els of workload differ depending on the task. For example, some tasks might
be difficult because they must be completed very quickly. Others may seem easy or hard because of the intensity of
mental or physical effort required. Yet others feel difficult because they cannot be performed well, no matter how
much effort is expended.
The evaluation you are about to perform is a technique developed by NASA to assess the relative importance of the
six factors that were included in the workload rating scale in determining how much workload you experienced
across all the test trials you just completed.
Below is a list of pairs of rating scale titles (for example Effort vs. Mental demand). For each pair, please circle the
item that was more important to your experience of workload across all the test trials you just completed.

MENTAL DEMAND

VS

PHYSICAL DEMAND

TEMPORAL DEMAND

VS

MENTAL DEMAND

PHYSICAL DEMAND

VS

TEMPORAL DEMAND

EFFORT

VS

PERFORMANCE

PERFORMANCE

VS

FRUSTRATION

TEMPORAL DEMAND

VS

PERFORMANCE

MENTAL DEMAND

VS

PERFORMANCE

PERFORMANCE

VS

PHYSICAL DEMAND

EFFORT

VS

FRUSTRATION

TEMPORAL DEMAND

VS

EFFORT

EFFORT

VS

MENTAL DEMAND

PHYSICAL DEMAND

VS

EFFORT

FRUSTRATION-

VS

TEMPORAL DEMAND

MENTAL DEMAND

VS

FRUSTRATION

FRUSTRATION

VS

PHYSICAL DEMAND

